Showing posts with label instability. Show all posts
Showing posts with label instability. Show all posts

Tuesday, 22 December 2009

AfPak tales

More news from the borderlands between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The Guardian reports US military units have conducted raids accross the border from Afghanistan into Pakistan, without notifying the Islamabad government.

I have a number of questions in relation to this story.


  1. Is this actually news? Should we be surprised by this report?
    US Forces and outsource partners like XE have been active within Pakistan for some years now in maintaining UAV's that execute kinetic operations against AQ leadership in Pakistan.
    The Guardian report makes a lot out of the fact that these were (a) "boots on the ground"-operations, and (b) that the Pakistani government was not informed of them.
    I've previously written about the lack of confidence of US leadership in the Pakistani goverment and senior military. In that sense, keeping the Pakistanis in the dark about these operations doesn't come as a surprise.

    The "boots on the ground"-element as a news item, contradicts the bit at the end of the article where The Guardian reveals that British SAS troops have been active in the restless Pakistani province of Balochistan back in 2002-2003 - "attacking drug traffickers". That actually is news!! (at least to me..)
    Attacking drug traffickers in 2002-2003 in Balochistan?
    - I find that difficult to believe. Why would the British government assign scarce resources in 2002-03 to go after druglords? And why there?
    Of course, drugs form a significant source of income to the OMF in Afghanistan. Back in those days however, Downing St 10 would have been better of ordering the SAS to fight the OMF head on: the coalition in those days was not focused on stopping the flows of income to the Taliban. Particularly because large swaths of Southern Afghanistan were not yet part of the ISAF operations, and were thus genuine uncontrolled territories where drugs and weapons could flow freely.
    Moreover, Balochistan is another one of those difficult Pakistani provinces where nationalistic tendencies and violence are all too common and where now most of the senior Afghan Taliban have found their hiding place in provincial capital Quetta. Back in 2002-2003 Musharraf was still very much in power. He certainly would have vocally disapproved of operations like these, in part to ascertain ethnic Balochi leadership that Pakistan extended beyond Punjab.

  2. Is there anything wrong with ops like these?
    If this is a blackhole in terms of international law (Pakistan doesn't exercise effective control in large parts of FATA and NWFP and assuming that illicit acts are contrived there), then why should we worry about the US taking matters into its own hands?
    In the domain of the Law of the Seas, hot pursuits on the high seas beyond territorial waters can be permitted. Why should this not be the case in combating transnational terrorists operating on the high seas of terra firma: failed states, or other territories where a credible state authority is completely absent.

  3. How come a NATO source tells us about this?
    That's another item that makes me curious. Generally ops like these are planned and executed by one nation may be two, in order to keep others in the dark so as to reduce the risk of details leaking out.
    What's NATO's part here?

  4. What's changed?
    Back in the Bush-era, operations like these were approached with a large degree of reluctance. Does the Obama-era herald a new age of new realism in the AfPak region? During the election campaign Obama already indicated he would authorize more US operations inside Pakistan to protect US interests. He clearly stands by his promise on this topic.
    Obviously, the Obama adminsitration seems to have a better understanding of the fact that Afghanistan and Pakistan both do not begin and end at the Durand line.

Monday, 21 December 2009

Is North Korea about to implode?

This question must be on the minds of senior policymakers and politicians from Washington to Tokyo to Moscow. Two weeks ago, news emerged from Pyongyang indicating that spontaneous rallies and demonstrations were held throughout the DPRK. The Pyongyang regime isn't too fond of civic creativity and spontaneity on the side of the populace; they resent it.

The terse reports that emerged from the country also mention that the armed forces have been put on alert to quell any serious uprising. Turmoil in the country is said to be the result of a significant devaluation of the country's currency, the won. The currency devaluation means even more hardship for the North Korean population; the monetary value of any savings they may have had is reduced as a consequence.

Meanwhile, Kim Jung-Il's minister of security affairs Ju Sang-song, has been dispatched to Beijing. The Chinese authorities may be able to teach him a lesson, or two about crowd control.

Sunday, 20 December 2009

A new fight in Pakistan: intragovernmental turmoil

Two significant developments in the Pakistani cabinet over the last week or two were hardly reported by the Western press.

  1. The control over the nation's nuclear arsenal was transferred from President Zardari to Prime Minister Gilani. Official statements from the Pakistani government describe this move as 'yet another' reparation of some of the usurpations of presidential power of the former president Musharraf (who rose to the position after a military coup).

    Other observers of Pakistani politics however note, that this transfer is part of an intricate set of political moves by Zardari, desperate to remain in power by staving off military or judicial interference. His position seems to have come under significant pressure from both the judicial branch and the Armed Forces generals in Rawalpindi. The Supreme Court is currently reviewing Zardari's (and other senior officials') amnesty in corruption cases. Mohammad Chaudhry, the Court's president still has a score to settle with Zardari and may be poised to do so.

    The Pakistani generals are also increasingly restless, there are so many developments yet so little transparency that it is hard to judge whether they may reach for political power soon. In a way, it doesn't help if a top general of your most important ally (?) has to come out to say a coup d'etat will not happen. In politics, if a player is forced to say there is trust in another actor, one can assume there is actually a lack of confidence.

  2. The other big development I wanted to write about for a little bit is the travel ban that's been imposed on a large slice of the Pakistan political and bureaucratic leadership. It's quite impressive news if some of a country's senior leadership is not allowed to cross the border and can even lead to embarassing situations. And because of these embarassements towards Pakistan's "all-time friend China", the Minister of the Interior has now been given the sack.

If all the above developments indicate anything it's just that Pakistan's internal politics are very much in turmoil. Now, that may not exactly be news to most of the followers of the region. The wider point here in my view is however the fact that most of the political disputes used to take place between the different branches of government (i.e. civilian government vs. the army, central government vs. state governments, government vs. the judiciary) but now a verocious and very public fight has erupted within the government.

It doesn't make for a nice picture at all...