Tuesday 22 December 2009

AfPak tales

More news from the borderlands between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The Guardian reports US military units have conducted raids accross the border from Afghanistan into Pakistan, without notifying the Islamabad government.

I have a number of questions in relation to this story.


  1. Is this actually news? Should we be surprised by this report?
    US Forces and outsource partners like XE have been active within Pakistan for some years now in maintaining UAV's that execute kinetic operations against AQ leadership in Pakistan.
    The Guardian report makes a lot out of the fact that these were (a) "boots on the ground"-operations, and (b) that the Pakistani government was not informed of them.
    I've previously written about the lack of confidence of US leadership in the Pakistani goverment and senior military. In that sense, keeping the Pakistanis in the dark about these operations doesn't come as a surprise.

    The "boots on the ground"-element as a news item, contradicts the bit at the end of the article where The Guardian reveals that British SAS troops have been active in the restless Pakistani province of Balochistan back in 2002-2003 - "attacking drug traffickers". That actually is news!! (at least to me..)
    Attacking drug traffickers in 2002-2003 in Balochistan?
    - I find that difficult to believe. Why would the British government assign scarce resources in 2002-03 to go after druglords? And why there?
    Of course, drugs form a significant source of income to the OMF in Afghanistan. Back in those days however, Downing St 10 would have been better of ordering the SAS to fight the OMF head on: the coalition in those days was not focused on stopping the flows of income to the Taliban. Particularly because large swaths of Southern Afghanistan were not yet part of the ISAF operations, and were thus genuine uncontrolled territories where drugs and weapons could flow freely.
    Moreover, Balochistan is another one of those difficult Pakistani provinces where nationalistic tendencies and violence are all too common and where now most of the senior Afghan Taliban have found their hiding place in provincial capital Quetta. Back in 2002-2003 Musharraf was still very much in power. He certainly would have vocally disapproved of operations like these, in part to ascertain ethnic Balochi leadership that Pakistan extended beyond Punjab.

  2. Is there anything wrong with ops like these?
    If this is a blackhole in terms of international law (Pakistan doesn't exercise effective control in large parts of FATA and NWFP and assuming that illicit acts are contrived there), then why should we worry about the US taking matters into its own hands?
    In the domain of the Law of the Seas, hot pursuits on the high seas beyond territorial waters can be permitted. Why should this not be the case in combating transnational terrorists operating on the high seas of terra firma: failed states, or other territories where a credible state authority is completely absent.

  3. How come a NATO source tells us about this?
    That's another item that makes me curious. Generally ops like these are planned and executed by one nation may be two, in order to keep others in the dark so as to reduce the risk of details leaking out.
    What's NATO's part here?

  4. What's changed?
    Back in the Bush-era, operations like these were approached with a large degree of reluctance. Does the Obama-era herald a new age of new realism in the AfPak region? During the election campaign Obama already indicated he would authorize more US operations inside Pakistan to protect US interests. He clearly stands by his promise on this topic.
    Obviously, the Obama adminsitration seems to have a better understanding of the fact that Afghanistan and Pakistan both do not begin and end at the Durand line.

2 comments:

  1. There is a relationship between NATO ISAF and JSOC, the command that oversees these operations on the U.S. side. As explained in General McChrystal's testimony in May, USFOR-A (which is dual-hatted with ISAF and works out of the same buildings) has tactical control over much of the JSOC task force in Afghanistan, even though CENTCOM retains operational control and presumably exercises tactical control when operations go cross-border.

    There is also a relationship between JSOC and SAS, which has been reported on many times in the British press and once or twice in Army Times: in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the UK SOF task force (composed of SAS, SBS, SRR, and 1 PARA elements) falls under the tactical control of the JSOC task force, although the UK presumably retains operational control and exercises tactical control for some UK national interest operations, such as the rescue of Stephen Farrell in which a trooper from 1 PARA was killed (although news sources reported that even in that operation, U.S. enablers were involved, such as aviation).

    ReplyDelete
  2. Hi Tintin,

    Many thanks for your insightful comments, only got to see it today (still new to blogging!). Once again, your comments proof that there is such a thing as wisdom of the crowds: the more comments the closer we get to the truth.

    Cheers,

    RE: Orient

    ReplyDelete